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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how financial aid reform based on postsecondary institutional performance impacts student
choice. Federal and state regulations often reflect concerns about the private, for-profit sector’s poor employment
outcomes and high loan defaults, despite the sector’s possible theoretical advantages. We use student-level data to
examine how eliminating public subsidies to attend low-performing for-profit institutions impacts students’ college
enrollment and completion behavior. Beginning in 2011, California tightened eligibility standards for their state aid
program, effectively eliminating most for-profit eligibility. Linking data on aid application to administrative
payment and postsecondary enrollment records, this paper utilizes a difference-in differences strategy to investigate
students’ enrollment and degree completion responses to changes in subsidies. We find that restricting the use of the
Cal Grant at for-profit institutions resulted in significant state savings but led to relatively small changes in students’
postsecondary trajectories. For older, nontraditional students we find no impact on enrollment or degree completion
outcomes. Similarly, for high school graduates, we find that for-profit enrollment remains strong. Unlike the older,
nontraditional students, however, there is some evidence of declines in for-profit degree completion and increased
enrollment at community colleges among the high school graduates, but these results are fairly small and sensitive to
empirical specification. Overall, our results suggest that both traditional and nontraditional students have relatively
inelastic preferences for for-profit colleges under aid-restricting policies.
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Introduction

The for-profit higher education sector expanded significantly in the twenty-first century (Deming
et al., 2012b),1 but concerns about poor student outcomes have catalyzed regulatory responses
(Department of Education, 2014; California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2013). One reason forprofit students have worse outcomes is that they are more likely to be considered “nontraditional,”
meaning disproportionately older, lower-income, first generation, single parents, or ethnic minority
students, and these characteristics are typically correlated with lower wages in the labor market. Yet
for-profit students experience weaker earnings prospects and are less likely to repay federal loans
on time, even relative to similar peers attending nonprofit institutions (Deming et al., 2012b).
Because of student debt and employability concerns in the for-profit sector, federal authorities enacted “gainful employment” regulations to deprive low-performing schools of Title IV aid, though
these were rescinded before going into effect. The underlying hope of aid-restricting policies is to
induce students to attend higher-quality postsecondary institutions and improve individual outcomes. A large literature provides evidence that students are generally responsive to tuition prices
and financial aid when making college attendance decisions, so it is likely that the loss of public
subsidies would affect student choice (Bettinger et al., 2019; Carruthers and Ozek, 2016; Cohodes
and Goodman, 2014; Nguyen et al., 2019).
This paper exploits detailed individual-level data to examine student responses to the loss of
institutional eligibility for a significant source of financial aid: California’s Cal Grant, the largest
state need- and merit-based aid program in the nation. Prior to 2011–2012, Cal Grant eligible
students could use in-state aid at for-profit institutions, with the program subsidizing up to $9,700
in tuition payments per year, for up to four years. Increasing for-profit attendance, along with
recession-borne budgetary pressures and reports of for-profits’ ineffectiveness, led California to
restrict Cal Grant usage at these institutions.2 Beginning with a small set of schools in the 2011–
1
For-profit enrollments comprised 4 percent of total Title-IV eligible enrollment at the turn of the century before
peaking at 11 percent in 2009, and receipts of federal Pell Grants—need-based grants to low-income students-grew
from $1.1 to $7.5 billion. Between Pell Grants and student loans, for-profit colleges received $32 billion from the
federal government in 2009–2010, a quarter of all Department of Education (DOE) student aid program funding
(Senate Committee on Health and Pensions, 2012). Despite declines after the Great Recession, enrollment in the
for-profit sector has nearly doubled since 2000, while overall enrollment grew by only a quarter (National Center for
Education Statistics, 2019).
2
For high school graduates, the rate of Cal Grant recipients who attended for-profit institutions rose from 2.7
percent in 2001–2002 to 4.9 percent in 2009–2010, whereas the for-profit usage rate among older, nontraditional
students increased at an even higher rate from 4.2 percent to 13.7 percent. California’s aid program thus experienced
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2012 academic year, and then expanding to most for-profit colleges in 2012–2013, new students
were no longer allowed to use their Cal Grants at these institutions, and continuing students saw
a 20 percent reduction in the size of their annual award.
The dramatic decrease in state subsidies to for-profit education makes California an ideal
location to study how financial aid reform based on institutional performance impacts student
choice. The Cal Grant offers two awards, one for traditional high school graduates and another for
older, nontraditional students, who more closely fit the typical profile of for-profit students. We
conduct separate analyses for these two groups, and estimate impacts via a difference-in-differences
strategy. Causal identification relies on two facts: 1) the FAFSA asks students to list colleges
where they want their financial aid information sent, and 2) the policy changes that restricted the
Cal Grant occurred after March 2nd, the Cal Grant application deadline. We then define treated
students as those who listed for-profit colleges on their FAFSA but were impacted by the sudden
elimination of state aid that occurred after they had submitted their applications. Counterfactual
trends in each analysis varies by the nature of the award program and are discussed in detail below;
for traditional students the counterfactual is based on a matched comparison group of students who
did not express interest in for-profit colleges on the FAFSA, whereas for nontraditional students the
program relies on an unobserved eligibility threshold, and we compare for-profit interested students
who fall just on either side of this criteria.
For nontraditional students, we find that restricting the use of the Cal Grant at for-profit institutions led to no change in student behaviors or outcomes, with these students choosing to remain
in the for-profit sector. Although the policy eliminated Cal Grant usage at for-profit colleges—a 62
percentage point decline in aid receipt at these institutions among eligible applicants-we observe no
impact on for-profit enrollment or associate’s degree attainment, with perhaps a slight decline in
for-profit bachelor’s degree attainment. There is no evidence these students shifted into alternate
postsecondary sectors, and we can reject an effect on degree completion in other sectors larger than
one percentage point.
For “traditional” high school students, we again find that students who lost state aid mostly
chose to enroll in for-profit colleges and forgo the Cal Grant. The results examining whether and
how much students shifted enrollment into alternate sectors are more mixed than for nontraditional
for-profit growth at the state level similar to national trends.
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students and present a number of empirical challenges. First, traditional students often consider
a range of different colleges, and even among those who listed a for-profit only 20 percent to 30
percent took the award to the for-profit sector in the years prior to the policy change. Second, our
sample of traditional students exhibits a declining trend in for-profit award utilization; even among
students who list a for-profit on the FAFSA, fewer actually used the award in that sector in more
recent years, perhaps in part to negative publicity and decreasing popularity of these institutions
in the later parts of the Great Recession. The smaller first-stage combined with the pretreatment
trend in Cal Grant usage makes our results sensitive to reasonable changes to our model, especially
which pretreatment years are included in the analysis. Altogether we find suggestive evidence of
declines in for-profit degree attainment, potentially explained by a combination of enrollment shifts
into community colleges and decisions not to attend college at all, though the magnitude of these
results varies by model specification. On one end of the spectrum we find that roughly 75 percent
of impacted students remained in the for-profit sector, with the remaining students evenly split
between enrolling in community colleges or choosing no college at all. Other specifications produce
results that mirror nontraditional students, where close to all students remained enrolled within
for-profit colleges, with shifts into other sectors statistically insignificant. Although this sensitivity
complicates the interpretation of our results, we nonetheless find a consistent story that preferences
for enrollment in the for-profit sector remain strong for both groups of students.
Our results show that student preferences for for-profit colleges are relatively inelastic to a
large subsidy loss, especially among older, nontraditional students, and in exploratory analyses we
speculate as to why. Although for-profits might offer more flexible modalities, such as a larger
selection of online courses, we do not find that students who live physically closer to a community
college campus are any more likely to shift sector of enrollment. We also find no evidence that
nontraditional students who had previously attended a community college were more or less likely
to shift enrollment than those who had not, suggesting that these inelastic preferences are not
likely to be driven by prior poor experiences in the public sector. One potential explanation are
the different types of degree programs offered by for-profit and public colleges. For instance, 46
percent of for-profit degrees earned in our high school sample are in the Health Professions CIP
code, compared to only 4 percent of public college degrees in the comparison group. Thus the
types of programs offered by for-profit colleges may be particularly attractive to certain groups
4

of students, particularly if public colleges cannot satisfy demand (Grosz, 2020). Whether this is
due to the actual content of for-profit degree programs, aggressive advertising practices, or other
factors, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our findings contribute to the literature examining whether and to what extent policy interventions that limit (e.g., closures of low-performing colleges Cellini et al. (2020); Darolia (2013))
or expand (e.g., school vouchers Hoxby (2003); Walters (2018)) educational choice improve the
quality of these decisions and lead to better economic outcomes. Our most consistent finding is
that regulations intended to move students out of for-profit colleges are unlikely to be effective
through large financial penalties alone. Students in our study lose significant funding but are still
eligible for the Pell Grant, federal loans, or other resources that facilitate attendance. If high costs
and poor labor market outcomes make for-profit colleges a poor decision, then only more severe
policies, such as institutional closure, are likely to shift student choice (Cellini et al., 2020).
Our study also improves on prior research by using individual-level data to examine shortterm matriculation and longer-term completion effects of for-profit regulation, rather than relying
on institutional-level data that limits the types of analyses available. Additionally, we focus on
recent cohorts of for-profit students experiencing the growth in online courses and other modern
forms of for-profit education, rather than prior studies that primarily rely on sanctions implemented
in the 1990s (Cellini et al., 2020). Our data show broadly similar responses to regulations for both
traditional and nontraditional students, though we find more evidence that the loss of aid negatively
impacted for-profit degree completion for high school students, without any compensatory gains in
degrees from other sectors (though exact estimates are imprecise). Future work hopes to examine
credit data outcomes for treated students (e.g., debt and default rates for various forms of credit,
including student loans), to see whether the loss of aid impacts financial health.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature;
Section 3 provides background on the California Student Aid Commission (CSAC) and the Cal
Grant Award; Section 4 describes our data and empirical methodology; Section 5 reviews the
results; and Section 6 concludes by discussing legal and policy implications and avenues for further
research.
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2

Literature Review

Higher education distributes economic gains unevenly across students. U.S. economic growth during the past few decades has disproportionately advantaged the most educated (Autor, 2014). The
benefits of postsecondary education have spurred calls for increased postsecondary access and completion, but budget pressures have led to lower state appropriations and higher tuition over time,
shifting the burden to family finances (Baum and Ma, 2013; Baum et al., 2015). The role of higher
education in income inequality has catalyzed interest in “mobility report cards,” which document
the role of American colleges in intergenerational mobility (Chetty et al., 2017). However, this research explicitly focuses on traditional students (recent high school graduates) and on birth cohorts
who matriculated prior to the expansion of for-profit education. The question of how nontraditional students, as distinct from traditional students, choose among sectors may shed light on their
long-term outcomes.
For-profit colleges possess multiple theoretical advantages. Their programmatic offerings
may be more market responsive, whether to occupational and wage growth in relevant sectors or to
changes in state college-age populations (Freeman, 1974; Gilpin et al., 2015; Turner, 2006). Their
academic programs’ flexibility and profit motive may make them agile enough to better innovate
and reach students left out of traditional higher education, such as rural students or working
students who prefer classes online and at atypical hours (Deming et al., 2012a,b). This deviation
from traditional academic structure gives for-profits the potential to bend the higher education cost
curve (Deming et al., 2015).
Despite these theoretical advantages, for-profit education has produced mixed results in practice. Research suggests that for-profit entry into the postsecondary market may lower costs (Deming
et al., 2015), though the availability of federal aid can increase both the supply of, and tuitions
charged by, for-profit institutions (Cellini, 2010). Private for-profit institutions still rely largely on
federal subsidies, and the sector’s federal default rates usually exceed the public and private nonprofit sectors (Ma et al., 2020). Evidence (including results from experimental studies) documents
how for-profit graduates may be viewed less favorably in the labor market (Darolia et al., 2015;
Deming et al., 2016; Looney and Yannelis, 2015; Cellini and Turner, 2019).
The federal government’s response has been to advocate for better consumer information
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and to target ineffective institutions. Federal law requires the disclosure of on-time graduation
rates, median debt loads, and tuition and fees charged. Yet the research to date suggests that
informational interventions by themselves may have limited ability to influence the decisions of
college-going students (Bergman et al., 2019; Booij et al., 2012; Gurantz et al., 2020; Hyman,
2020). This may be particularly true for nontraditional or otherwise marginalized students. For
example, the release of the College Scorecard likely had the largest impacts in application behavior
among the most advantaged students (Hurwitz and Smith, 2018).
Beyond information, the federal government fashioned penalties, now partly rescinded, for
schools failing to produce favorable student economic outcomes. Low-performing institutions whose
cohort default rates are excessively high have long lost access to federal funds.3 In 2014, the
Department of Education finalized regulations that, for the first time, interpreted the “gainful
employment” requirement of Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA) to connote a minimum
threshold of income-to-debt for programs, including most for-profit programs, with the penalty of
losing institutional eligibility for federal funds. While these gainful employment standards were
rescinded in 2019, some states are considering independently adopting them (California Assembly,
2019).
Institution-level sanctions and related college closures have been shown to impact student
choices and outcomes. Previous efforts by the federal government to tie high cohort default rates
to the elimination of federal aid disbursement at low-performing colleges altered student behavior,
decreasing the enrollment of new students at targeted for-profits and pushing Pell-eligible students
into neighboring community colleges (Cellini et al., 2020; Darolia, 2013). Pushing for-profit students
into other similarly nonselective institutions could improve outcomes, partly because community
colleges are less expensive than for-profit institutions and may provide similar returns (Cellini,
2012; Cellini and Chaudhary, 2014; Cellini et al., 2020).
Our study contributes both to the literature on how changes in institutional eligibility for
aid impact student choice (Cellini et al., 2020; Darolia, 2013; Wiederspan, 2016) as well as previous
research isolating factors predictive of for-profit enrollment (Chung, 2012). We are able to measure
impacts of institutional performance-based changes in for-profit subsidies on enrollment of both
3

The California Legislative Analyst’s Office provides a helpful history of cohort default rates in its contemporaneous
discussion of the policy shocks studied in this paper (California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2013).
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traditional and nontraditional students (Seftor and Turner, 2002). Previous research on the Cal
Grant finds large impacts on the sector of enrollment and postsecondary completion for traditional
students in the late 1990s, though for-profit attendance was relatively limited for these cohorts
(Bettinger et al., 2019). For nontraditional students who applied to the Cal Grant in the early 2000s,
the program had positive impacts on for-profit degree completion, but no impacts on attainment
for older students intending to enroll in community colleges (Gurantz, Forthcoming). Our research
complements this previous work on the potentially muted impacts of aid for nontraditional students,
and highlights the policy challenges of nudging students towards public alternatives and out of lowperforming for-profit institutions.

3
3.1

Institutional Background
California Student Aid Commission (CSAC) and the Cal Grant Award

The California Student Aid Commission (CSAC) administers the Cal Grant program, the largest
state aid program in the nation. California residents apply for the Cal Grant by submitting the
Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), as well as a one-page GPA verification form
that is submitted to CSAC directly by the relevant high school or college administration. The
application deadline for students who wish to attend a four-year or private institution is March
2nd, which corresponds to the FAFSA application deadline for California.4
The Cal Grant targets low- and middle-income students. Students can earn an award through
one of two primary methods: the Entitlement grant, for “traditional” high school graduates who
meet basic GPA and income eligibility criteria, and the Competitive grant, which is awarded in a
more selective fashion. The Entitlement grant is available only to those students graduating high
school or who graduated the previous year, and there are no numerical caps for the number of
grants awarded. To qualify, students from middle-income families must have earned an unadjusted
3.0 GPA in high school, and students from low-income families must have earned an unadjusted 2.0
GPA in high school (income limits that define middle- and low-income families vary by year and
family size and are shown in Appendix Table A1). The second method is the Competitive grant,
4
For nontraditional students there are two deadlines: March 2nd and September 2nd. The September 2nd deadline
is only for students interested in attending community colleges and is not used in this paper as it does not have any
impact on for-profit enrollment and occurred after the surprise announcements detailing the aid-restricting policies.
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available to older, “nontraditional” students who are two or more years out of high school. Students
earn up to 200 points based on a methodology that accounts for GPA (submitted from either the
high school or most recent college), parents’ educational level, student or parent household status
(marital status, orphan status), family income, household size, and the “access equalizer,” which
takes into account other measures of student disadvantage. There are limited Competitive awards
offered per year at the March deadline—capped at 11,250 during the time period studied—and
CSAC sorts applicants in descending order and offers awards until the cap is reached, leading to
an annually varying eligibility threshold to receive the grant. The Competitive award eligibility
criteria are detailed in Gurantz (Forthcoming) and also described in Appendix A.
Regardless of whether a student earns an Entitlement or Competitive grant, they qualify
for one of two payment options referred to as Cal Grant A or B. Ultimately the payment choices
are relatively similar and ignored in our analysis, which focuses on receiving an award offer rather
than which they choose. Students with a GPA above 3.0 are eligible for A, and those who are lowincome are eligible for B, with those meeting both criteria able to choose between the two awards.
Cal Grant A offers four years of full tuition fees at any in-state public four-year institution, or an
annual subsidy for nonprofit or for-profit private colleges for up to $9,708. Cal Grant B differs
from Cal Grant A in three distinct ways. First, students are also provided a subsistence award,
equal to roughly $1,551 per year, for up to four years, to be used for “living expenses and expenses
related to transportation, supplies, and books.” Second, this living expense from Cal Grant B can
be used while a student attends a community college, though the grant does not cover community
college tuition fees. Finally, there is one significant negative consequence to Cal Grant B: it only
covers tuition for three years (rather than four), beginning in the second year of the award or
when students have obtained sophomore status (as self-reported on the FAFSA), so nontraditional
students typically can receive the tuition subsidy immediately. Both Cal Grant awards can be put
on hold for two years for students who wish to delay their college enrollment.

3.2

Policy Change: Senate Bill 70 and the Budget Act of 2012

On March 24th, 2011, a few weeks after the Cal Grant deadline, Governor Jerry Brown signed
Senate Bill 70 into law. The bill mandated reductions in state spending on Cal Grants by eliminating
eligibility among institutions with a three-year cohort default rate above 24.6 percent. This process
9

prevented students from taking their Cal Grant award to 76 schools in the 2011–2012 academic
year, though many of these schools were branches of larger systems. Currently enrolled students
could continue to attend these ineligible institutions, but awards to these continuing students were
reduced by 20 percent. Students were directly notified of these changes in May 2011, two months
after the FAFSA was submitted, removing concerns that college preferences listed on the FAFSA
were endogenously shaped by the policy.
The Budget Act of 2012, part of the annual budgeting process in the subsequent year, was
signed into law on June 27th, 2012, and imposed a number of additional changes to the Cal Grant
program. Primarily, it created a larger set of 154 ineligible postsecondary schools with a cohort
default rate above 15.5 percent or a graduation rate below 30 percent. As before, continuing
students saw their award amount reduced.5 In both years these rules did not apply to institutions
where 40 percent or less of their undergraduate students borrowed federal loans, a plan that was
designed to ensure that community colleges were not impacted by this policy change. Appendix B
shows the full list of ineligible institutions.

4

Data and Empirical Method

4.1

Data

CSAC provided student-level administrative data on all Cal Grant applicants who submitted the
FAFSA and GPA verification forms by the March 2nd deadline from 2007 through 2012. Throughout the paper we refer to the applicants as two distinct groups: “traditional” students, indicating
high school graduates applying for the Entitlement grant, and “nontraditional” students, indicating older students who apply for the Competitive award. The traditional sample includes students
who met minimum GPA and income requirements and were offered, but did not necessarily use, a
Cal Grant award. For the nontraditional group we include all eligible applicants who may or may
not have earned an award depending on the year-specific eligibility threshold for the Competitive
award. The data elements consist of variables typically collected on the FAFSA (e.g., income,
family size, dependency status, educational level, the list of schools to which information should
5

For students wishing to attend any private institutions, the Budget Act of 2012 saw the maximum award reduced
$485 (from $9,708 to $9,223). Continuing students at now-ineligible institutions thus experienced a 20 percent
reduction to $7,380 (from the new base of $9,223).
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be sent), along with student GPA, which determines Cal Grant eligibility. Students can reapply in
later years so we include only the first application year for each individual; this is relevant for the
nontraditional sample but has no impact for traditional students, who almost immediately age out
of award eligibility for the Entitlement award.
Outcome data are received from two sources. The first is administrative CSAC data, which
tracks annual Cal Grant payments for each student and identifies the college receiving the award.
Students may be offered a Cal Grant award but not use it if they choose not to attend college;
they attend college out of state; they choose to attend an ineligible institution (either schools made
newly ineligible or smaller schools that are not Title IV eligible); if they are only eligible for Cal
Grant A but choose to attend a community college; or if they place their award on hold, a method
most typically used by community college students who prefer to apply the award after potentially
transferring to a four-year college in the future, though this does not happen much in practice. The
second data source are individual-level data on postsecondary attendance and completion from
the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC), which collects information on more than 98 percent of
students enrolled in public and private colleges within the United States. With both datasets we
observe students’ college trajectories through 2015–2016, which includes four years after the last
2012 cohort submitted their Cal Grant application.
We are unable to link all applicant records to the National Student Clearinghouse data due to
cost considerations. We trim our samples in two ways. For the nontraditional sample, we observe
all students who listed an ineligible for-profit who were up to 15 points below and 25 points above
the eligibility cutoff, which includes 34,649 observations.6 For traditional students we first select
all high school graduates who list any for-profit institution on the FAFSA, as these students comprise our treatment group. We then construct a comparison group using coarsened exact matching
(CEM) techniques (Iacus et al., 2012). This approach minimizes potential bias between the treatment and control groups by implementing direct matches on student characteristics, rather than
relying on propensity score methods that rely on functional form assumptions linking observable
characteristics to treatment assignment. We match students on a limited set of characteristics:
application year; sex; terciles of neighborhood income based on Census data; and three categories
6

Competitive award points exhibit a normal distribution, with the eligibility cutoff falling roughly one standard
deviation above the mean each year. As there are significantly fewer students above the cutoff than below, we select
a larger bandwidth above, though results are invariant to this choice.
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which determine whether a student was eligible for Cal Grant A only, B only, or could choose between either award. This last category accounts for basic differences in GPA and income between
students as it is based on income and GPA cutoffs. We then select one random control student
within the CEM strata that is then assigned as a match to the treated student. This is done
without replacement, leading to 51,116 students evenly split between treatment and control.
Unfortunately, many for-profit institutions do not report data to the NSC, complicating our
analysis of enrollment and completion effects. (This does not affect estimates on Cal Grant usage,
which are observable for all students.) To deal with this issue we use a subsample of students
who list FAFSA colleges that have ”good” coverage properties in the NSC data. Our method to
define good coverage is as follows: 1) identify students with a Cal Grant payment, which accurately
identifies enrollment; 2) observe whether that individual also appears in the NSC data; 3) aggregate
this statistic up to the college level, and; 4) define good coverage as colleges where more than 60
percent of the students receiving Cal Grant payments appear in the NSC data. (In practice most
schools are at the extreme end of the spectrum with either few missing or almost all missing.) We
observe good coverage for a few large for-profit chains that are popular in our sample, including
Devry, Heald, ITT, and the University of Phoenix, although most for-profit colleges have poor
coverage rates. (See Appendix Table A2 for a more detailed breakdown.) In addition, most forprofits with good coverage rates were those that became ineligible in 2012 and not those in 2011,
so NSC subsample regressions eliminate most applicants who list a for-profit that became ineligible
in 2011 or never became ineligible.7
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics separately for the traditional and nontraditional samples. The first two columns show values for the traditional applicants who listed an ineligible
for-profit and their matched comparison group, and the remaining columns show nontraditional
students who scored above and below the eligibility threshold. The traditional sample matches
the profile of a typical low-income high school graduate, as these students are mostly 18 or 19
7

NSC results are similar when focusing just on students who list 2012 ineligible colleges. We classify students who
list both 2011 and 2012 ineligible colleges as belonging to the 2011 group, but results are invariant to the inclusion
or omission of these few students. In the nontraditional sample, 73 percent of students who list a 2012 ineligible
college have good coverage rates, compared to 16 percent who list 2011 ineligible colleges and 0 percent of for-profits
that were not eliminated, which is the primary reason we do not focus on this last group for comparison purposes.
In the traditional group the comparable statistics are 48 percent, compared to 7 percent and 0 percent, respectively.
Students who do not list for-profits have good coverage 84 percent of the time, as most public colleges and universities
report to the NSC.
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years old with generally low GPA (2.7) and family income ($21,200), and most have dependent
tax-filing status (87 percent). Background characteristics between students who listed a for-profit
and the matched comparison group are generally similar by construction. The nontraditional sample averages roughly 30 years old and is generally lower income and higher GPA than the high
school sample; this is due in part to the fact that we focus on students near the Competitive award
eligibility cutoff, and students with low income and a high GPA score higher on this index.
Traditional and nontraditional applicants differ significantly in how they approach the college
enrollment decision. First, high school students generally list multiple schools on their FAFSA, with
for-profit applicants listing an average of 3.4 colleges (median = 2). Among high school students
listing an ineligible for-profit, 49 percent also listed a community college, 28 percent listed a CSU,
27 percent listed a UC, 14 percent listed a private, nonprofit, and 10 percent listed an out-of-state
college, suggesting that these students are considering a variety of postsecondary options. This is
not the case for nontraditional students, who rarely list alternate schools on their FAFSA, with an
average of 1.1 colleges; the most common outside option is a community college, but this occurs
on only 4 percent of applications. As discussed in Gurantz (Forthcoming), this likely occurs for
two reasons: nontraditional students are more constrained in their choice sets due to additional
family and work commitments; and many applicants are continuing students already enrolled in a
postsecondary institution and so list only one school on their FAFSA, rather than high schoolers
entering the postsecondary sector who are weighing various options.
Differences in college listings results in varying patterns of Cal Grant usage, with traditional
students both less likely to use the award and less likely to do so at a for-profit college. Focusing just
on early cohorts unaffected by the policy shift, only 53 percent of high school students listing a forprofit used the award, with 34 percent at a for-profit, 13 percent at a community college, and most
not enrolling in college at all. Among nontraditional students, 68 percent who met the eligibility
criteria used the award and almost all of them did so at for-profit colleges. For both groups, if we
focus on students who actually used the award, we find slightly over $13,000 in expenditures per
student over a four-year period.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
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4.2

Empirical Method

We use a difference-in-differences strategy to construct a causal estimate of the change in Cal
Grant institutional eligibility standards on student outcomes. As discussed above, the new criteria
resulted in a large group of low-performing colleges (mainly for-profit institutions) ineligible to
receive Cal Grant funds. As our sample consists only of California applicants (all of whom were
subject to the policy change), we identify our treatment group through an instrument that strongly
predicts attendance at a for-profit institution but is exogenous to the policy change. Our approach
is to use the set of institutions listed on a student’s FAFSA to differentiate eligible students who
are interested in for-profit colleges, who are likely to be impacted by the policy shift, from students
who are theoretically unaffected by the policy.
FAFSA preferences are assumed to be exogenous to the policy change, as students were required to submit school preferences by the March 2nd FAFSA submission deadline, whereas the
policy actions occurred at the end of March 2011 and June 2012. Thus, students’ listed preferences were recorded prior to the policy change and should be an accurate indication of their true
preferences based on the assumption, correct at the time of application, that they were eligible to
utilize Cal Grants to attend those institutions. Regardless of the policy change, students interested
in schools later deemed ineligible to receive Cal Grants still had reason to list those institutions
on their FAFSA forms for reasons independent of Cal Grant award eligibility. For example, a traditional high school student would want to use the Pell Grant at any one of the institutions they
were considering, even if they might have (somehow) harbored suspicions as to future Cal Grant
eligibility.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the impact of these two policies on Cal Grant utilization at forprofit institutions for traditional high school graduates and nontraditional students, respectively,
with each figure reflecting our empirical strategy. We divide the nontraditional sample into four
groups, based on whether a student listed the following on the FAFSA: 1) a for-profit school that
became ineligible in 2011; 2) a for-profit school that became ineligible in 2012 (but was eligible
in 2011), and for each of these two groups, whether or not the student was above and below the
eligibility threshold. Figure 1 shows that roughly 60–70 percent of those initially offered the award
received a financial aid payment at a for-profit the following year. Some students below the cutoff
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were able to become Cal Grant eligible, but this only led to roughly 10–20 percent Cal Grant
usage at a for-profit college, producing a large first-stage difference in award receipt based on their
position relative to the eligibility threshold.8 The implementation of the policy led to sharp declines
in for-profit usage, essentially eliminating the gap in aid receipt once the state rescinded for-profit
eligibility.
Figure 1: For-Profit Cal Grant Payments, Nontraditional (Competitive) Students

Notes: Figure includes all nontraditional students who applied for the Competitive award, listed
an ineligible for-profit on the FAFSA, and were within 15 points below and 25 points above the
eligibility threshold. Outcome is the percent of students who received a Cal Grant payment at a
for-profit college the year after first applying, disaggregated by whether they 1) listed a 2011 or
2012 ineligible for-profit, and 2) were above or below the eligibility threshold.
For the nontraditional, Competitive students, our basic estimation framework is a differencein-difference design that compares students above and below the threshold, though later robustness
checks show regression discontinuity results are identical. Our estimating equation is
(1) Yict = β0 + β1 T reatmentict + δt + µc + Eligibleit + ict
8

Some students below the cutoff may ultimately receive a Cal Grant award by petitioning to have their scores
corrected; becoming eligible for an alternate award, the Cal Grant C; or if there were errors in the data provided
to us by CSAC. Gurantz (Forthcoming) shows the validity of these data for regression discontinuity analysis (i.e.,
smoothness of covariates and density and the threshold), leading to the conclusion that any error in classification
would be random and not associated with award eligibility. The Cal Grant C can also be used at for-profits but offers
a much smaller subsidy of roughly $3,000 maximum for two years rather than four.
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For this framework, Yict is the outcome of interest for student i who lists for-profit college
type c (we refer to this as their ”FAFSA group”) in cohort t; δt and µc are, respectively, year
and FAFSA group fixed effects; and Eligibleit indicates whether or not student i is above the
Competitive eligibility threshold in year t. T reatment is then a binary variable that takes on the
value of 1 for eligible students who listed a 2011 ineligible for-profit college on their FAFSA in 2011,
or students who listed a 2012 ineligible for-profit college on their FAFSA in 2012.9 Thus β1 is our
parameter of interest that identifies the causal impact of the policy shift on students’ enrollment
decisions. We report heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors as our error term ict .
Figure 2: For-Profit Cal Grant Payments, Traditional (Entitlement) Students

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income
and GPA eligibility requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched
comparison group, as described in the text. Outcome is the percent of students who received a
Cal Grant payment at a for-profit college the year after first applying, disaggregated by whether
they listed 1) 2011 ineligible for-profit, 2) 2012 ineligible for-profit, 3) a for-profit that maintained
eligibility, or 4) no for-profit college.
9

Technically, T reatmentict is also 1 for students who in the academic year 2012 listed a 2011 ineligible for-profit
college. For nontraditional students we find that very few students did so in practice, as the elimination of these
colleges the prior year left nontraditional students little motivation to submit their GPA verification form to apply
for the award; we remove these students from the analysis because they are exceedingly few in number, though their
inclusion does not change results. This is not true below for traditional students, who actively considered many
different colleges simultaneously and (as noted above) would still prefer to list ineligible colleges on their FAFSA for
potential Pell Grant or federal loan eligiblity to attend those colleges
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For the traditional, Entitlement sample, we divide applicants into four groups, based on
whether a student listed the following on the FAFSA: 1) a for-profit school that became ineligible in
2011; 2) a for-profit school that became ineligible in 2012 (but was eligible in 2011); 3) no for-profit
schools; and 4) just for illustration purposes, a for-profit school that never become ineligible (these
students are not used as control group students as none of these colleges reported enrollment data
to the NSC). Figure 2 shows that early in the preperiod roughly 40 percent of traditional students
who listed a for-profit on their FAFSA used the Cal Grant award at a for-profit institution, but
this value had dropped to 27 percent by 2011 for the largest group of students listing soon to
be ineligible for-profits. In addition to some students not attending college, Cal Grant usage at
for-profits was lower for high school students because they frequently chose to enroll in alternate
postsecondary sectors, such as community colleges, or attended college out of state. Students who
listed for-profits that remained eligible under the program were generally unaffected, though we
note relative declines in award utilization over this time period (Figure 2), perhaps as negative
publicity surrounding for-profit colleges became more expansive.10 As expected, the policy change
eliminated Cal Grant usage at for-profit colleges but had no impact on for-profit utilization among
students who did not list any for-profit institution on the FAFSA. Although for-profit interest was
declining during this period, it was not obsolete. As shown by the continued interest among the
few students whose for-profits were not cut from the program, it is likely that many students would
have chosen to use their Cal Grant at for-profit colleges in 2012 if they remained eligible.
For the traditional student analysis, we adjust our methodology to account for the downward
sloping pretreatment trend observed in Figure 2.11 Rather than the typical group-and-year twoway fixed effects approach, we parameterize year as a linear variable, in addition to including year
and group fixed effects. In specification charts below, we estimate this model under a number of
different conditions and find that some results are fairly sensitive to the specification used.
Our empirical model is then specified as follows:
(1) Yict = β0 + β1 T reatmentict + yearc + µc + ict
10

As discussed above, nationwide enrollment in for-profit institutions expanded significantly in the 2000s peaking
in 2009. Trends in for-profit enrollment in California followed similar trends peaking in 2010 before seeing declines
in 2011 and 2012 and then increasing again in 2013 (see Appendix Figures A1 and A2).
11
We cannot use the publicly known GPA and income eligibility thresholds to estimate impacts for the traditional
Entitlement sample as applicants often choose not to apply when they are ineligible for the award.
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In this estimation, Yict is the outcome of interest for student i who belongs to FAFSA group
c in cohort t, where there are three groups, including those who listed a 2011 ineligible for-profit,
a 2012 ineligible for-profit, or neither (and serves as the comparison group). The variables yearc
and µc area linear time trend and fixed effects for each FAFSA group respectively. T reatment
is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 for eligible students who listed a 2011 ineligible
for-profit college on their FAFSA in 2011 or 2012, or students who listed a 2012 ineligible for-profit
college on their FAFSA in 2012.12 Thus β1 is our parameter of interest that identifies the causal
impact of the policy shift on students’ enrollment decisions. We report heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors as our error term ict .
Our approach relies on the validity of our categorization of students into treatment and
control groups. As discussed above, we use the schools that applicants listed in their FAFSA
as an indication of their interest in attending ineligible for-profit institutions. Those applicants
indicating an interest in the soon-to-be ineligible institutions were placed in our treatment group.
A key assumption of this approach is that the schools listed by applicants on the FAFSA reflects
their true preferences prior to any knowledge of the policy changes. This assumption is plausible
because the policy changes were announced after the Cal Grant application deadline, and therefore,
after applicants had submitted their FAFSA forms.
The primary threats to our identification strategy are changes in observed or unobserved
factors (distinct from the policy change) that shift college-going decisions over time and differ
between our treatment and control groups. We show below that results exhibit similar pretreatment
trends in sector of postsecondary attendance and are robust to inclusion of covariates that account
for slight differences across cohorts. In addition to these statistical checks, there are a number of
other reasons our approach eliminates or dramatically reduces potential confounding bias. This
policy change occurred significantly after the worst parts of the Great Recession, which began in
2007 and drove large changes in college enrollments. Another consideration is that there were
no tuition increases in California’s public system between 2011–2012 and 2012–2013, the two years
that span the largest policy change, though there were some substantial increases in previous years.
Finally, for the nontraditional sample, the threshold values for student eligibility from 2009 through
12

In contrast to the nontraditional sample, we find that many students graduating high school in 2012 still listed
2011 ineligible for-profits as a potential college, as they were considering a multitude of colleges, and this would have
been needed to be eligible for a Pell Grant.
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2012 were 161, 163, 165, and 165, respectively, so there was little change to the marginal student
across this time period.

5
5.1

Results
Nontraditional “Competitive” Cal Grant Applicants

We begin with nontraditional students. The results in Table 2 show that the policy change led to
a large decline in Cal Grant usage for the treatment sample, reflected in Figure 1, and resulted in
the near complete abandonment of the Cal Grant. That abandonment suggests that the students
in our sample have almost fully inelastic preferences for for-profit enrollment.
Table 2 shows that Cal Grant usage at for-profit colleges declined 62 percentage points. This
is the entire gap in for-profit usage in the preperiods, where about 70 percent and 10 percent
of students above and below the cutoff used the Cal Grant award at a for-profit (see Figure 1).
Another way to examine this difference is by examining changes to the use of Cal Grant aid in
other postsecondary sectors. There is no evidence that the nontraditional students were interested
in enrolling in other postsecondary sectors. The increase in the proportion of students who choose
to forgo the Cal Grant altogether (63 percentage points) almost identically matches the decrease
in Cal Grant usage at for-profit colleges. There is no observed shift of Cal Grant payments into
two-year public colleges or four-year colleges (including both public or private, nonprofits), and
confidence intervals reject increases in enrollment larger than one-half of one percentage point. As
a result of this policy shock, the total dollars spent per nontraditional, for-profit applicant dropped
roughly $6,470 in the first year, almost fully eliminating the prior state expenditures of $6,977 per
student per award offer.
The large changes in Cal Grant usage after one year dissipate quickly over time, from 62
percentage points in the first year to 1 percentage point in the fourth year. (We track year-by-year
Cal Grant usage for the four years of eligibility in Appendix Table A3, but Table 2 shows Cal Grant
usage just in the fourth year.) The reason is relatively straightforward—exit rates from for-profit
colleges are extremely high, and even in years where the policy existed, only 3 percent of initially
eligible students were still using their awards four years later. As a result, the total dollar amount
that the state saved over the four-year lifetime of the award offer is approximately $10,013 (with
20

Table 2: Impact of for-profit policy change on nontraditional students’ Cal Grant usage, postsecondary enrollment, and attainment

a standard error of $147), completely eliminating the average state expenditure of $9,984 for the
cohort just prior to the policy change.
However, the large decline in Cal Grant usage does not translate into meaningful drops in
for-profit enrollment or any increase in enrollment at other two-year or four-year colleges. NSC
data (Table 2, columns 3 and 4) show a statistically insignificant 2 percentage point decline in forprofit enrollment from a baseline of close to 80 percent. Four years later the difference in for-profit
enrollment is a statistically insignificant −0.8 percentage points. (Year-by-year NSC enrollment
results are in Appendix Table A4).13
13

NSC results actually show a slight increase of about 3 percentage points in the number of treated students who
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Even with the policy change, essentially all nontraditional students remained in the for-profit
sector without a Cal Grant. In addition, we find no large changes in degree completion after
the policy change. The last columns of Table 2 show that the loss of aid led to mostly small
and statistically insignificant decreases in degree completion. The largest single point estimate is
a 1.5 percentage point decline in bachelor’s degree completion at for-profit colleges. This result
is consistent in magnitude with the four percentage point increase in for-profit bachelor’s degree
completion found in Gurantz (Forthcoming), which aggregates multiple years of data to produce
more precise estimates of the impact of receiving a Cal Grant.

5.1.1

Nontraditional “Competitive” Cal Grant Applicants: Robustness Checks

We measure the robustness of these results in two primary ways. First, Figure 3 shows results on
Cal Grant usage from a nonparametric event study design that centers the policy change on either
2011 or 2012, depending on which college was listed on the FAFSA, and includes the four years
prior to treatment along with the treatment year; the omitted year is the year prior to the policy
change. These figures provide evidence of parallel trends and confirm little to no impact on twoyear or four-year Cal Grant usage outside the for-profit system. Appendix Figures A3 and A4 show
similar pretreatment trends when examining results on postsecondary enrollment or attainment as
measured by NSC data.
Second, we examine how estimates change under reasonable adjustments to methodology or
sample restrictions. Although the results above focus on the sample who list colleges with good
NSC coverage, Appendix Table A3 shows that the pattern of impacts on Cal Grant usage is the
same when we use the full sample of students. A recent literature raises estimation concerns for
difference-in-difference designs, particularly with staggered treatment timing, but Appendix Table
A5 mimics Table 2 with separate estimates for those listing 2011 or 2012 ineligible for-profit colleges,
and results are essentially identical.14
choose no postsecondary enrollment in the first year, once all sectors are taken into account. This appears slightly
strange at first glance, though one possible explanation is that when students were able to use their Cal Grants at
for-profits, they could use other resources to attend educational institutions in multiple sectors; for example, when
students were able to use their Cal Grants to pay tuition at their for-profit institution, it freed up money they could
use to supplement the for-profit program with community college courses. At baseline, about 4 and 2 percent of
treated students attend, respectively, a public two-year or any four-year college.
14
See Baker et al. (2021) for a summary of these estimation issues. Students listing 2011 ineligible for-profits
are only 19 percent of the total nontraditional sample, but when we restrict the sample to those with good NSC
coverage, they only constitute 5 percent of the total sample as most of those colleges do not report enrollment

22

Figure 3: Pretreatment trends of Cal Grant usage, Nontraditional, Competitive’ sample

Notes: Figure includes all nontraditional students who applied for the Competitive award, listed an ineligible forprofit on the FAFSA that had good NSC coverage, and were within 15 points below and 25 points above the
eligibility threshold. Outcome is whether the student received a Cal Grant payment in the year after first applying,
disaggregated by sector. Results are estimated by an event study design that centers students at zero for the year
their for-profit of interest became ineligible, and omits the year prior to the policy change.

Finally, we include specification charts that vary the sample composition or estimation
methodology in a number of alternate ways (Figure 4). For illustration we focus on Cal Grant
usage at community colleges as the primary example. First we use our main analysis on the NSC
subsample from above and show that results do not change if we narrow the bandwidth to 10 points
on each side, add covariates, or remove the cohort just prior to the relevant policy change.15 We
then reestimate impacts that combines regression discontinuity (RD) and difference-in-differences
data to the NSC. This explains why the treatment results are essentially the same between the full sample and the
2012 subsample, and why the 2011-only results produce noisy estimates. We also apply the “honest” difference-indifferences methodology by Rambachan and Roth (2021) to the nontraditional sample, but, as expected, the results
do not change our interpretation. For the large decline in for-profit usage, the results are immune to even very large
violations in pretreatment trends, and otherwise this procedure simply reaffirms that our remaining results are null.
We reserve more discussion of this technique for the traditional sample below, where the methodology is more useful.
15
We remove the prior cohort as a robustness check for two reasons. First, as interest in for-profits began to decline
at this time, this cohort may theoretically experience sharp changes in enrollment rates that are distinct from the
policy change. Second, the CSAC policy change allowed the existing cohorts to keep their for-profit Cal Grant but
removed 20 percent of the subsidy in the first year, and then eliminated it altogether two years later. This loss may
have negatively impacted the persistence of the immediately prior cohorts, though the full elimination was unlikely
to affect many students as for-profit Cal Grant payment receipt was already extremely low at roughly 17 percent by
the third year after being offered an award (see Appendix Table A3).
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designs and results are unchanged.16 Finally, we re-estimate but use a more parametric design
where we allow for-profit enrollment to change linearly for each separate group over our 2007–2012
time period, and results are unchanged. (We include this approach as it is more useful for our
estimation of impacts for the traditional high school sample below.). In all cases our results remain wholly unchanged, providing consistent evidence that nontraditional students did not shift
their Cal Grant awards to support community college enrollment. Additional specification charts
are provided in Appendix Figures A6 through A8, and use NSC data to examine for-profit and
community college enrollment as well as degree completion from for-profit and alternate sectors,
which are consistently small and statistically insignificant; results for four-year college enrollment
are similar and omitted for brevity.
Figure 4: Specification Chart for Cal Grant usage at Community Colleges, Competitive

Notes: Figure includes all nontraditional students who applied for the Competitive award, listed an ineligible forprofit on the FAFSA, and were within 15 points below and 25 points above the eligibility threshold. Outcome is the
percent of students who received a Cal Grant payment at a California community college the year after first applying.
Each column in the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the methodology (diff-in-diff, regression
discontinuity), modeling choice (nonparametric versus linear time trends in the diff-in-diff estimation), sample (all
applicants, only those with good NSC coverage, bandwidth size, removing the year prior to the policy change), and
inclusion of covariates.
16

In practice we estimate RD impacts in each year, treat the preperiod as baseline, and calculate how much the
RD estimates change in the policy year.
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5.2

High School “Entitlement” Cal Grant Applicants

We present results for the traditional sample of high school students applying for the Entitlement
award, using the same general structure as results reported above. Descriptive data above show
that these for-profit seeking students are more likely to list multiple colleges on the FAFSA and
more likely to attend alternate postsecondary sectors, and so may also be more likely to respond to
the loss of aid by shifting their enrollment patterns (see earlier Table 1 and Figure 2). The key issue
for “traditional” high school students is a declining trend in taking the Cal Grant to the for-profit
sector, even among students expressing interest in these for-profits, which leads us to include a
linear time trend in our estimation strategy.
In Table 3 we present results from a model similar to Table 2, which focuses on our NSC
subsample and includes all years from 2007 through 2012.17 We note up front that the estimates in
Table 3 are consistently the largest in magnitude, in terms of indicating that students might leave
for-profits for alternate sectors, and that in robustness tests below many of these same estimates
are closer to zero and statistically insignificant, particularly in models that eliminate the earliest
cohorts.
Table 3 provides some evidence that traditional students interested in for-profits are more
responsive to the loss of the Cal Grant than nontraditional students, even though most still chose
to forgo state aid and stay enrolled in for-profit colleges. First, we find Cal Grant for-profit usage
declines by 27 percentage points in the first year, but increases by 6 percentage points in community
colleges. Counterintuitively, Cal Grant usage declines by 5 percentage points in four-year public
or private, nonprofit colleges. Examining actual enrollment based on NSC records, there was a 7
percentage point decline in for-profit attendance, a 4 percentage point increase in community college
attendance, and a statistically insignificant 3 percentage point decline in four-year enrollment, which
altogether leads to a 5 percentage point increase in no college enrollment at all in the first year.
By the fourth year after the program we find the policy led to no changes in overall enrollment
compared to prior cohorts, likely due in part to the high exit rates from for-profit colleges (41
percent of students in the prior cohort enrolled in a for-profit but only 10 percent were still there
by year four). Year-by-year results on Cal Grant payments and enrollment patterns are shown
17

For brevity we avoid showing results from a nonparametric specification as the pretreatment trends are consistently violated and clearly tend to overstate impacts on students shifts into alternate sectors.
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in Appendix Tables A6 and A7. Results based on the full sample that does not condition on
NSC coverage offer a similar pattern, with a 19 percentage point decline in for-profit usage, a
4 percentage point increase in community college attendance, and a smaller but still negative 2
percentage point decline in four-year college attendance. The savings to the state as a result of this
policy are smaller than for nontraditional students, as fewer traditional students took the award to
the more expensive for-profit colleges, but still reached $1,708 in the first year and $2,329 over the
lifetime of the grant.
Table 3: Impact of for-profit policy change on traditional students’ Cal Grant usage, postsecondary
enrollment, and attainment

The large attendance declines in for-profit colleges, combined with less aid for those who
maintained their enrollment, led to an 8 percentage point drop in degrees earned from for-profits,
26

mostly from associate’s degrees. Although some students may have shifted out of for-profits into
community colleges, we find no evidence of increases in degree completion at community colleges
after four years. Similarly, we find no evidence of any changes in degree completion from four-year
colleges.
We show below that Table 3 estimates are likely upper bounds for how much students are
willing to shift into alternate postsecondary sectors, although we consistently find no evidence of
gains in degree completion from other sectors. Nonetheless, taken at face value, even the largest
estimates imply that of the students who lost aid, approximately 75 percent stayed in the for-profit
sector (a 7 percent percentage point decline in for-profit attendance due to a 27 percent percentage
point decline in aid usage).

5.2.1

High School “Entitlement” Cal Grant Applicants: Robustness Checks

In our robustness checks, we consistently find that the loss of aid led most students to remain in
for-profit colleges. In alternate specifications we tend to find that the shift into community colleges
and out of four-year colleges to be smaller in magnitude and often statistically insignificant, and
in some models the declines in for-profit attendance and degree completion become as small as
1 to 2 percentage points. The most important adjustment driving these estimates toward zero is
restricting the sample to only more recent years of data (e.g., starting in 2009 rather than 2007),
due to the declining trend in for-profit usage in the preperiod even among eligible students.
Figure 5 shows generally flat pretreatment trends based on our linear model, though a few
estimates are significantly different from zero.18 This occurs because fitting a linear trend to the
model results in some small deviations from prior years, which explains some of the subsequent
sensitivity, but still corrects significant problems with pretreatment trends in the nonparametric
two-way fixed effects model (results not shown). Similar to the nontraditional sample, Table 3 uses
the subsample of students with available NSC outcome data, and Appendix Table A6 shows fairly
similar patterns when we use the full sample of students.
Figure 6 shows a specification chart examining first-year usage of the Cal Grant at commu18
This model centers year on 2011 or 2012 depending on which for-profit (and associated matched group) was listed
on the FAFSA, uses a balanced panel of five years including four years prior to treatment and first posttreatment
year, estimates a linear function for each group between four years and one year prior to treatment, and adds dummy
variables for the remaining years. Appendix Figures A9 and A10 show similar pretreatment trends for NSC enrollment
and attainment.
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Figure 5: Pretreatment trends of Cal Grant usage, Traditional Entitlement sample

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college that had good NSC coverage or were part of the matched comparison
group, as described in the text. Outcome is whether the student received a Cal Grant payment in the year after first
applying, disaggregated by sector. Results are estimated by an event study design that includes linear time trends,
centers students at zero for the year their for-profit of interest became ineligible, and omits the years one and four
years prior to the policy change.

nity colleges, varying results by whether our model 1) includes year dummies, in addition to the
linear trend; 2) uses the full sample or NSC subsample; 3) uses 2007, 2008, or 2009 as the initial
data year; and 4) includes covariates. Across specifications, the point estimates on shifts into community college vary from roughly 2 to 6 percentage points, and are mostly statistically significant.
Point estimates are smallest when we start with the 2009 data, a consistent pattern across later
specification charts. Changes in point estimates are also related to variation in the actual size of
the first-stage decline in for-profit usage, which is closer to 30 percentage points in models starting
in 2007 but declines to as low as 15 percentage points in models that start with 2009 data; this
specification chart is shown in Appendix Figure A11.
Additional specification charts, provided in appendices, tell a story of generally small shifts
into alternate sectors, at least relative to the policy-induced decline in state aid receipt, with some-
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Figure 6: Specification Chart for Cal Grant usage at Community Colleges, Entitlement

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Outcome is the percent of students who received a Cal Grant payment at a California community college the
year after first applying. Each column in the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the modeling
choice (whether or not year dummies are included), sample (all applicants, only those with good NSC coverage, omits
2007, omits 2008), and inclusion of covariates.

what high variability in point estimates that make it difficult to draw strong conclusions beyond
students’ general preference for for-profit enrollment. Charts for Cal Grant usage in the four-year
sector are provided in Appendix Figure A12, and using no Cal Grant in Appendix Figure A13.
Estimates on shifts into four-year colleges that are almost all zero, with the larger negative estimates, as in Table 3, driven only by models that use the NSC subsample and include year dummies.
Appendix Figures A14, A15, A16, and A17 show specification charts for NSC enrollment results
for for-profit, community college, four-year, and no enrollment. Point estimates for the declines
in for-profit enrollment vary quite widely from 1 to 9 percentage points, enrollment increases in
community colleges vary from 1 to 4 percentage points, and declines in four-year college enrollment
vary from 0 to 3 percentage points, leading to declines in overall enrollment that vary from 0 to 5
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percentage points. Finally, Appendix Figures A18, and A19 examine changes in degree completion
from for-profits versus other sectors. Estimates on declines in for-profit degrees fluctuate between
2 and 9 percentage points, whereas estimates on degree changes from other sectors are consistently
null, at roughly negative 1 percentage point.
As is clear from the prior paragraph, our results indicating shifts into alternate postsecondary
sectors vary quite significantly across specifications, suggesting we should be cautious in our interpretation as to whether and how much students shift out of the for-profit sector when aid is
restricted. An additional way we examine this is to apply the “honest” approach of Roth and
Rambachan (2020), and, as might be expected, for all outcomes our confidence intervals include
null values if we assume even incredibly small deviations from parallel trends (e.g., if the pretreatment trend in an outcome varies by even one percentage point per year the confidence interval
includes insignificant estimates, even though Figure 5 shows typical year-to-year variation is much
larger). The only exception in this analysis is the clear impact of the policy change on decreasing
Cal Grant usage at for-profit colleges.19 Although many have raised estimation concerns for some
difference-in-differences designs, they do not change our results for two reasons: 1) a “stacked”
approach that estimates results separately for students who list 2011 and 2012 for-profit colleges,
against their matched comparison group, produces similar results, though the 2011 estimates are
very noisy due to the much smaller sample size, as shown in Appendix Table A8; and 2) we study
immediate effects in the first treated cohort, and so are not subject to issues of dynamic treatment
effects that often bias aggregated results.20 (Results estimated via Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021)
produce similar estimates and are omitted for brevity.)

5.3

Exploratory Analysis of Inelastic Preferences

In this section we consider why we might observe inelastic preference for for-profit attendance, and
discuss these results in the concluding section. One important consideration is that our results are
specific to the context of our study, where students are losing state aid in a surprising manner but
19

Appendix Figures A20 and A21 show estimated impacts of the policy change on using a Cal Grant at a for-profit
and community college, respectively, varying the parameter M (e.g., assumption about annual change in pretreatment
trend) from one to four percentage points. Although the Cal Grant usage at for-profits remains robust to a very large
pretreatment trend, even a one percentage point shift shows a wide range of possible treatment effects for shifts into
community colleges
20
Similarity in results when disaggregating by type of college listed is again due to the relatively small number of
students listing 2011 ineligible for-profits (only 8 percent in the NSC subsample).
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are still theoretically eligible for federal grants and loans. The second consideration is that, as with
all administrative data, we have only a limited range of variables available to test for differences
between groups. For example, one possibility is that for-profit colleges induce enrollment through
aggressive outreach practices that prey on people’s fears, or offer some financial inducements (e.g.,
“free” laptops) in response to the policy change, and we are unable to observe whether these actions
occur.
One potential reason for inelastic preferences is if students are interested in programs offered
by for-profit colleges that are inaccessible at alternative colleges (Gilpin et al., 2015). For example,
health professions are in high demand and financially remunerative, but California’s community
colleges are oversubscribed and incapable of meeting total demand (Grosz, 2020). To examine
potential mismatch we observe a proxy for field of study by counting total degrees earned in the
NSC data, using the first two digits of the CIP provided and aggregating some CIP codes to
highlight patterns found in the data.21
We find large differences in the types of degrees earned by students in for-profit colleges,
relative to alternate institutions. Figure 7 shows that among traditional students who earned a
for-profit degree, 46 percent did so in a Health Professions field, compared to only 4 percent in twoyear and four-year colleges. An additional 27 percent of for-profit degrees earned were in Business,
IT, and Engineering Tech fields, over twice as many as other colleges. Only 3 percent of students
in for-profits earned a degree in General or Social Sciences, although these degrees are incredibly
common and constitute 26 percent of total degrees outside for-profits, likely in part because they
are earned by community college students looking to transfer to four-year colleges.22
Another hypothesis is that for-profits, at least during this time period, offered more flexible
course arrangements and modalities that would be attractive to students. We cannot identify how
students took their courses but can examine whether distance to a community college matters,
under the assumption that students living farther from a community college might have more
21

Not all recorded majors have a CIP code in the NSC data, and we find disparities across sectors as 55 percent of
for-profit degrees had a CIP code compared to 80 percent of community colleges and four-year colleges.
22
Results are generally similar if we compare to two-year or four-year colleges separately, rather than combining
the two. CIP code mappings are Health Professions (51), Business (52), Computer and Information Services (11),
Engineering Tech (15), Liberal Arts and Sciences, General Studies, and Humanities (24), and Social Sciences (45).
One note is that most Engineering degrees at public colleges are CIP code 14, which differs from the more vocationally
oriented degrees in CIP code 15. We find roughly similar results for nontraditional students, with for-profit degrees
of 24 percent, 40 percent, and 3 percent in health professions, the aggregated business and engineering category, and
general and social sciences, relative to 8 percent, 16 percent, and 20 percent.
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Figure 7: Distribution of degrees earned by CIP code, Traditional students

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, either listed a for-profit college that had good NSC coverage or were part of the matched comparison
group, and earned a degree in the NSC data. Outcome is the two-digit CIP code of the NSC degree, disaggregated
by Health (51), Business; Computer/Information; Engineering Tech (11,15,52), General and Social Sciences (24,45),
and all other CIP codes.

inelastic preferences given the higher barriers to public college enrollment. Appendix Table A9
shows that interacting distance to the closest community college has no predictive power on any
treatment effects, suggesting that the inelastic preferences might not be driven by differences in
modality.23
A final consideration is whether students are unwilling to shift enrollment because they had
already enrolled and been unsuccessful within the community college system. Among nontraditional
students, NSC data show that 41 percent attended a community college in the three years prior to
their Cal Grant application, and if they had poor prior experiences they may be less responsive to
23
We include both a distance measure as a control and then interact distance with our treatment outcome. We do
not observe traditional students’ home address but can observe the high school they attended and measure distance
between high school and closest community college as identified by IPEDS data. The distribution indicates all
students lived between 0.4 and 81 miles of a community college, with an average of 4.6 miles and 75th and 90th
percentiles of 9.3 and 25.8 miles, respectively. Appendix Table A9 presents results that use a linear distance that is
topcoded at 30 miles, but alternate estimates that topcode distance at 10, 15, and 20 miles, or that divide the sample
into distance terciles and compares point estimates, produce similar results.
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aid loss than those who had not attended recently. This is not the case in our data, as Appendix
Table A10 shows no difference between these two groups in their responsiveness to the loss of aid.24

6

Conclusion

We use data from the Cal Grant, the largest merit- and need-based state aid program in the nation,
to examine how eliminating public subsidies to attend for-profit institutions impacts students’
college enrollment and completion behavior. We find that both traditional and nontraditional
students significantly decreased Cal Grant usage in the for-profit sector. While we find some
evidence of partial substitution into community colleges by traditional students, we find no such
evidence of substitution among nontraditional students. This inelasticity does not appear to be
explained by either distance to or poor prior experience with community colleges.
Before discussing implications, we must compare the California policy to federal law and
policy. From the student perspective, the negative financial shock to grant aid in this paper is
significantly larger than what would be experienced under the loss of Title IV eligibility. The Cal
Grant award subsidizes roughly $9,700 per year for four full years, whereas the maximum Pell Grant
was $5,550 in 2012–2013, with current regulations providing six years of lifetime eligibility. Our
data show that for-profit students have low retention rates and quick time to degree completion,
implying that the student-level grant aid loss exceeds federal analogs.
On the other hand, the loss of Title IV eligibility could have more meaningful student- and
institutional-level impacts that are likely to be more meaningful than the loss of the Cal Grant. At
the student level, the California policy did not impact federal loan eligibility, thus allowing students
to receive both grants and loans to support their attendance. At the institutional-level, the loss
of Title IV eligibility under federal regulations would eliminate almost all revenue to a specific
institution, and would often lead to closure (Kelchen, 2017). In contrast, our results estimate a
different parameter that arises from the loss of funding to individual students, rather than wholesale
changes to the operating structure of the for-profit college.
We believe our results suggest a number of legal and policy implications. First, insofar
as our findings suggest limited or no substitution effects between the for-profit and other higher
24

We do not do this analysis for traditional students as relatively few attended community college the prior year.
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education sectors, policymakers should be wary of using such aid restrictions to “nudge” students
into alternate colleges. Though we find some evidence that traditional students partly respond by
enrolling in community colleges, even in our most optimistic results the effect sizes are far more
muted than those in Cellini et al. (2020), which estimate gains to community college enrollment
that offset roughly two-thirds of the losses in the for-profit sector. This likely occurs for two reasons.
First, as noted above, we are estimating a policy that limits aid and provides a strong negative
signal of for-profit quality but does not systematically shut down the institution. Also, because
Cellini et al. (2020) rely on aggregated institutional data from 1990s to generate their estimates,
our results might more closely mirror student decision-making in the current higher education
environment.
Accordingly, policymakers looking to divert prospective students away from poorly performing for-profits toward higher-performing alternatives should acknowledge aid restriction’s limitations. One potential concern is the difference in type of degree earned between for-profit colleges
and community colleges. This asymmetry may partly explain why students are disinclined to shift
enrollment. For example, community college nursing programs are in high demand and their degrees
produce large positive wage returns, so students may turn to for-profit institutions when locked out
of public programs (Grosz, 2020). Yet some for-profit colleges have been criminally liable for exaggerated claims about the employment of their graduates, and others may be “inducing” demand
via aggressive advertising practices. It may not be the best course of action to allow for-profits
to be the continued supplier of these degrees, assuming public colleges can respond to consumer
demand and expand programs.
In sum, as both federal and state governments continue to think about ways to address poorly
performing for-profit institutions, they should take note of the relatively inelastic demand for such
programs. One implication is that policymakers should explore other timeframes for intervening
in the college selection process for prospective for-profit students, including, if possible, before the
FAFSA is filed. Policymakers can also influence student choice by helping public colleges import
the program attributes that have given rise to such for-profit demand.
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Figure A1: Total For-Profit Enrollment in CA (2000-2016)

Notes: Estimates calculated using IPEDS data from the Urban Institute’s ‘educationdata’ Stata package.

Figure A2: Growth in For-Profit Enrollment in CA (2000-2016)

Notes: Estimates calculated using IPEDS data from the Urban Institute’s ‘educationdata’ Stata package.
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Figure A3: Pretreatment trends of postsecondary enrollment, Nontraditional (Competitive) sample

Notes: Figure includes all nontraditional students who applied for the Competitive award, listed an ineligible forprofit on the FAFSA that had good NSC coverage, and were within 15 points below and 25 points above the eligibility
threshold. Outcome is whether the student enrolled in college in the year after first applying, using NSC data and
disaggregated by sector. Results are estimated by an event study design that centers students at zero for the year
their for-profit of interest became ineligible and omits the year prior to the policy change.
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Figure A4: Pretreatment trends of degree attainment, Nontraditional (Competitive) sample

Notes: Figure includes all nontraditional students who applied for the Competitive award, listed an ineligible forprofit on the FAFSA that had good NSC coverage, and were within 15 points below and 25 points above the eligibility
threshold. Outcome is whether the student earned a degree within four years, using NSC data and disaggregated by
sector. Results are estimated by an event study design that centers students at zero for the year their for-profit of
interest became ineligible, and omits the year prior to the policy change.
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Figure A5: Specification Chart Nontraditional Students: NSC enrollment in community colleges,
year 1

Notes: Figure includes all nontraditional students who applied for the Competitive award, listed an ineligible forprofit on the FAFSA, and were within 15 points below and 25 points above the eligibility threshold. Each column in
the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the methodology (diff-in-diff, regression discontinuity),
modeling choice (nonparametric versus linear time trends in the diff-in-diff estimation), sample (all applicants, only
those with good NSC coverage, bandwidth size, removing the year prior to the policy change), and inclusion of
covariates.
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Figure A6: Specification Chart Nontraditional Students: NSC enrollment in for-profit colleges, year
1

Notes: Figure includes all nontraditional students who applied for the Competitive award, listed an ineligible forprofit on the FAFSA, and were within 15 points below and 25 points above the eligibility threshold. Each column in
the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the methodology (diff-in-diff, regression discontinuity),
modeling choice (nonparametric versus linear time trends in the diff-in-diff estimation), sample (all applicants, only
those with good NSC coverage, bandwidth size, removing the year prior to the policy change), and inclusion of
covariates.
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Figure A7: Specification Chart Nontraditional Students: Degree completion at for-profit colleges
(NSC)

Notes: Figure includes all nontraditional students who applied for the Competitive award, listed an ineligible forprofit on the FAFSA, and were within 15 points below and 25 points above the eligibility threshold. Each column in
the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the methodology (diff-in-diff, regression discontinuity),
modeling choice (nonparametric versus linear time trends in the diff-in-diff estimation), sample (all applicants, only
those with good NSC coverage, bandwidth size, removing the year prior to the policy change), and inclusion of
covariates.
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Figure A8: Specification Chart Nontraditional Students: Degree completion not from for-profit
colleges (NSC)

Notes: Figure includes all nontraditional students who applied for the Competitive award, listed an ineligible forprofit on the FAFSA, and were within 15 points below and 25 points above the eligibility threshold. Each column in
the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the methodology (diff-in-diff, regression discontinuity),
modeling choice (nonparametric versus linear time trends in the diff-in-diff estimation), sample (all applicants, only
those with good NSC coverage, bandwidth size, removing the year prior to the policy change), and inclusion of
covariates.
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Figure A9: Pretreatment trends of postsecondary enrollment, Traditional (Entitlement) sample

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college that had good NSC coverage or were part of the matched comparison
group, as described in the text. Outcome is whether the student enrolled in college in the year after first applying,
using NSC data and disaggregated by sector. Results are estimated by an event study design that includes linear
time trends, centers students at zero for the year their for-profit of interest became ineligible, and omits the years
one and four years prior to the policy change.
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Figure A10: Pretreatment trends of postsecondary attainment, Traditional (Entitlement) sample

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college that had good NSC coverage or were part of the matched comparison
group, as described in the text. Outcome is whether the student earned a degree within four years, using NSC data
and disaggregated by sector. Results are estimated by an event study design that includes linear time trends, centers
students at zero for the year their for-profit of interest became ineligible, and omits the years one and four years prior
to the policy change.
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Figure A11: Specification Chart Traditional Students: Cal Grant usage in for-profit colleges, year
1

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Each column in the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the modeling choice (whether or
not year dummies are included), sample (all applicants, only those with good NSC coverage, omits 2007, omits 2008),
and inclusion of covariates.
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Figure A12: Specification Chart Traditional Students: Cal Grant usage in four-year colleges, year
1

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Each column in the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the modeling choice (whether or
not year dummies are included), sample (all applicants, only those with good NSC coverage, omits 2007, omits 2008),
and inclusion of covariates.

48

Figure A13: Specification Chart Traditional Students: No Cal Grant usage, year 1

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Each column in the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the modeling choice (whether or
not year dummies are included), sample (all applicants, only those with good NSC coverage, omits 2007, omits 2008),
and inclusion of covariates.
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Figure A14: Specification Chart Traditional Students: NSC enrollment in for-profit colleges, year
1

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Each column in the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the modeling choice (whether or
not year dummies are included), sample (all applicants, only those with good NSC coverage, omits 2007, omits 2008),
and inclusion of covariates.
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Figure A15: Specification Chart Traditional Students: NSC enrollment in community colleges, year
1

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Each column in the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the modeling choice (whether or
not year dummies are included), sample (all applicants, only those with good NSC coverage, omits 2007, omits 2008),
and inclusion of covariates.
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Figure A16: Specification Chart Traditional Students: NSC enrollment in four-year colleges, year
1

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Each column in the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the modeling choice (whether or
not year dummies are included), sample (all applicants, only those with good NSC coverage, omits 2007, omits 2008),
and inclusion of covariates.
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Figure A17: Specification Chart Traditional Students: No NSC enrollment, year 1

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Each column in the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the modeling choice (whether or
not year dummies are included), sample (all applicants, only those with good NSC coverage, omits 2007, omits 2008),
and inclusion of covariates.
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Figure A18: Specification Chart Traditional Students: Degree completion at for-profit colleges
(NSC)

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Each column in the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the modeling choice (whether or
not year dummies are included), sample (all applicants, only those with good NSC coverage, omits 2007, omits 2008),
and inclusion of covariates.
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Figure A19: Specification Chart Traditional Students: Degree completion not from for-profit colleges (NSC)

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Each column in the specification chart is a separate estimate that varies by the modeling choice (whether or
not year dummies are included), sample (all applicants, only those with good NSC coverage, omits 2007, omits 2008),
and inclusion of covariates.
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Figure A20: HonestDiD approach of Rambachan and Roth: Cal Grant usage at for-profit college

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Outcome is the treatment effect from the loss of Cal Grant eligibility at for-profits on using a Cal Grant at
a for-profit college the following year. Figure applies the ‘honestdid’ methodology of Rambachan and Roth (2021),
assuming the slope in pre-trends varies by increments of one percentage point.
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Figure A21: HonestDiD approach of Rambachan and Roth: Cal Grant usage at community college

Notes: Figure includes all traditional students who applied for the Entitlement award, met income and GPA eligibility
requirements, and either listed a for-profit college or were part of the matched comparison group, as described in the
text. Outcome is the treatment effect from the loss of Cal Grant eligibility at for-profits on using a Cal Grant at a
community college the following year. Figure applies the ‘honestdid’ methodology of Rambachan and Roth (2021),
assuming the slope in pre-trends varies by increments of one percentage point.
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Table A1: Cal Grant Income and Asset Limits

Notes: Cal Grant A is only available to students who earn a 3.0 GPA, and Cal Grant B is only available to students
who are classified as “low-income,” the ceiling for which during the period of our study generally varied from about
$30,000 to $50,000 in family income for dependent students, depending on family size, and $30,000 for independents
without any of their own dependents. For high school students, this means that (1) middle-income students with a 3.0
GPA earn Cal Grant A; (2) low-income students with a GPA below 3.0 GPA earn Cal Grant B, and (3) low-income
students above a 3.0 GPA can choose between A or B. Nontraditional students who earn the Competitive award can
choose between A or B depending simply on whether they meet the Cal Grant B income limits.
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Table A2: For-Profit Payments and NSC coverage

NSC identify postsecondary enrollment for the majority of students enrolled in the United States,
though privacy laws and complications with student matching may result in a lower rate. One
challenge with using NSC data in this context is that many for-profit colleges, as well as a handful
of public or nonprofit, private institutions, can choose not to report their enrollment records (Dynarski et al., 2015). The table below reproduces the full list of Cal Grant payments to for-profit
colleges, which is not hampered by NSC reporting issues (original version is found in Gurantz
(Forthcoming)). For each college we can identify whether it had good NSC coverage by calculating
how often a student who receives a Cal Grant payment also appears in the NSC data. This exercise
shows that NSC data on for-profit colleges essentially identifies attendance or completion results
for five large colleges: University of Phoenix, Heald, ITT, DeVry, and Academy of Art University.
In practice, the first three colleges listed are also by far the most popular colleges in the Cal Grant
applicant pool. Some ITT and Heald branches became ineligible in 2011, but all five colleges were
ineligible beginning in 2012.

Notes: Sample includes all Cal Grant payments made to for-profit colleges in the year after first application, on
behalf of nontraditional Competitive award applicants.
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Table A3: Cal Grant payments over time, Nontraditional Competitive Sample
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Table A4: NSC Enrollment over time, Nontraditional Competitive Sample
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Table A5: Impacts by Type of Ineligible For-Profit College, Nontraditional Competitive Sample
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Table A6: Cal Grant payments over time, Traditional Entitlement Sample
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Table A7: NSC Enrollment over time, Traditional Entitlement Sample
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Table A8: Impacts by Type of Ineligible For-Profit College, Traditional Entitlement Sample
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Table A9: Impact of for-profit policy change on traditional students’ Cal Grant usage and postsecondary enrollment, interacted with distance to closest community college
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Table A10: Impact of for-profit policy change on nontraditional students’ Cal Grant usage and
postsecondary enrollment, prior community college enrollment
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Appendix A: Competitive Award Background
The Competitive Cal Grant program began in 2001 and requires California residents to 1) be
two or more years removed from earning their high school degree, 2) complete the FAFSA, and 3)
complete a GPA verification form, submitted directly by the administration of the corresponding
high school or college.25 The state allocates awards in two “cycles” depending on whether the
application is completed by March 2nd or September 2nd. Our paper focuses only on students
who submitted by March 2nd, as the September 2nd deadline is only for students interested in
community college attendance.
Award winners are provided four years of a cash “subsistence” award to be used for “living
expenses and expenses related to transportation, supplies, and books,” equal to $1,551 per year.
Students attending any in-state public four-year institution also receive three years of full tuition
and fees, whereas those attending accredited private institutions––either nonprofits or Title IV eligible for-profits––can receive tuition subsidies up to $9,708 per year. Students who use an award
are automatically renewed each year for up to four years, as long as they complete their FAFSA
and meet Satisfactory Academic Progress; there is no continued scoring process. Cal Grant tuition
payments are “first-dollar” scholarships, meaning that aid is paid to institutions before other forms
of financial aid are considered. Although the only aid we can observe is payments made directly
by CSAC, previous work on the Cal Grant found that receiving the grant did not change participation in other federal programs such as the Pell Grant or federal tax credits (Bettinger et al., 2019).
CSAC determines award eligibility by assigning students a score between 60 and 200 through
a systematic scoring process that involves no human discretion. Eligible students are rank ordered
by their point totals, from highest to lowest, with awards offered to the top 11,250 students in
each cycle. The key takeaway is that changing applicant pools produced a year-varying eligibility
cutoff score that is ex ante unknown to CSAC or any applicants, as shown in Appendix Table 1.
Scoring consists of five distinct components, and the majority of the information relies on student
self-reports on the FAFSA. The five components are briefly summarized below:
1) GPA (70 points): Applicants must have a minimum 2.0 GPA. An unweighted GPA of 2.0
earns the minimum score of 30 points, with this score increasing linearly up to a maximum of 70
for a 4.0 GPA.
2) Income and family size (76 points): Lower income and larger family size increase the point
total, with four different scales for dependents and independents who are single, married, or have
their own dependents.
3) Parent education level (18 points): Five and nine points are assigned for each parent whose
highest education level is high school or below high school, respectively.
4) Student or parent household status (18 points): A dependent student with parents who are
unmarried, divorced, or widowed earns 18 points. An independent student who is single with dependents earns 18 points. There are additional exceptions for orphans or wards of the court, though
this affects few applicants.
25
CSAC only uses a college GPA after a student has attempted at least 24 semester units. College GPAs are given
priority over high school GPA, but if a student has both a community college and four-year college GPA, preference
is given to the higher value.
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5) Access Equalizer (18 points): Students can earn points one of two ways: (i) Students with
college experience—the vast majority of applicants—earn between 0 and 18 points, with more
points assigned to students with less postsecondary experience and a longer period of time since
they graduated high school. (ii) Students with no college experience are assigned 18 points if they
graduated from a high school identified as disadvantaged or if they earned a GED. Students are
considered to have no college experience if they submit a high school GPA, rather than college.
GED scores are converted to a GPA-point equivalent by CSAC.
Although many students actively choose to submit the GPA verification form, CSAC has
attempted to ease the process by entering into data-sharing agreements with various sectors of the
California higher education system, primarily public two- and four-year institutions. As a result,
CSAC receives automated GPA transfers for most continuing students in public colleges who submit a FAFSA. These students are automatically entered into the applicant pool, even if they are
not aware of the award itself.
Students who ultimately earn the Competitive award are entitled to receive one of two payment options, referred to as Cal Grant A and Cal Grant B. In practice, over 95 percent of eligible
Competitive award students elect to use the Cal Grant B payment. To qualify for Cal Grant B,
students must be classified as “low-income,” which are defined by CSAC-generated cutoffs that are
typically about half the maximum income limit for dependents (or independents with dependents),
shown in Appendix Table 1 as the Cal Grant B eligibility income limits. Any single or married
independent student without dependents is considered low-income. The Cal Grant A option differs
from Cal Grant B in four ways. First, students can only select this option if they have a GPA of
3.0 or higher. Second, it offers four years of full tuition payments, rather than the three offered
by Cal Grant B. Tuition payments under Cal Grant A can be used immediately, whereas students
receiving Cal Grant B must have achieved sophomore status or higher, as self-identified through
the FAFSA. The final but most important difference is that the Cal Grant A option does not include the cash subsistence award, which explains why most applicants select the Cal Grant B option.
Students who apply by the March deadline and do not earn an award, but indicate on the
FAFSA that their degree objective is in earning a degree in an occupational or technical program,
can reapply for a smaller financial award known as Cal Grant C. Roughly six percent of the
applicant sample who fall just below the March eligibility threshold is offered one of these Cal
Grant C awards, which slightly decreases the financial contrast between treatment and control
groups. The eligibility process is significantly more complicated for this award, as students must
actively re-apply for Cal Grant C. At the time, they were scored based on their academic history,
length of work history, and letter of recommendation, as well as receiving extra points for intending
to enroll in a program deemed high-need by the state. The exact amounts offered are $2,462 in
tuition and fees and $547 for books, tools, and equipment, for up to two years. Approximately
11 percent of for-profit students below the threshold received a payment through this program.
Even though a portion of for-profit students below the threshold get this award, there is still a
very large change in the likelihood of receiving any Cal Grant payment in the first year, and the
treatment-control contrast in dollars received is large, in part because Cal Grant C pays relatively
little.
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Appendix B: Ineligibility Lists
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